Facilitating Better Governance?

Last night my father, Ahmad Ghais, spoke to a group I belong to here in Colorado called the International Business Circle. He spoke (alongside Monir Ludin and moderator Paul Kullman) on the topic of the origins of Islamist extremism. It was a great discussion (and nice for me to be a relaxed audience member instead of the speaker!). As you might expect, the Arab Spring came up, and with it the question of whether Arabs are “ready for democracy.”

Well, this one always gets me a little riled up. Some say Arab culture or the Islamic faith is not compatible with democracy, which always strikes me as condescending. Isn’t everyone in the world capable of expressing their interests and needs in the political sphere? Does anyone really deserve to live in a society where innocents can be thrown in jail? Some folks are enthusiastic to help political development in other countries by setting up democratic institutions modeled after ours; others say it’s none of our business how another country governs itself and we have no right to impose our system on others.

The problem with these debates is that when we talk about democracy, or even a broader term like good governance, the assumption is that the Western models–parliamentary systems and presidential systems–are the only way to go. These standard models do bear features of Western culture, especially individualism and competitiveness, and I’m not aware of much serious work in helping develop new or hybrid models that respond to local needs and cultures (although this book presents the interesting case of Malaysia).

If we break down this huge concept democracy into its component parts or functions, we can ask how these functions can be accomplished in a way suitable to the particular society. Components might include government accountability, popular participation, separation and limitation of powers, rule of law, etc. Let’s take  popular participation as an example. As Monir pointed out last night, there is a long tradition in Islamic thought and practice of shura, or consultation. What if we asked, Where is shura working well? Who conducts it? What institutions and skills are required? What are its shortcomings and how might they be overcome? How can we replicate what works and adjust what doesn’t?

The practice of facilitation has much to offer here to help resolve the tension in wanting to help but not wanting to impose our way of life. A facilitator manages the process, while group participants do the substance, from conveying their views and interests and needs to making decisions. The facilitator can be a catalyst, but is in no way imposing outcomes.

What if every not-so-democratic country undertook the exercise, in an inclusive, participatory manner, of figuring out what good governance should look like for themselves? What if local facilitators managed the discussion and fed results into a national dialogue or a constitution-building forum? What if the role of the outsider was to help stimulate and facilitate this discussion, in partnership with local facilitators? Maybe then we’d end up with some models of democracy that might actually work in their host countries.

Of course, any good governance requires the slow, painstaking process of building institutions as well as the mental shift among citizens of understanding their own role in governance. Last night, my dad pointed out that most Arabs identify governance with the individual leader rather than with institutions. In such respects, it is true that most Arab societies have a long way to go. We also need to remember, of course, that our own system of governance is far from perfect, that our democracy will (hopefully) continue to evolve, and that we don’t have the perfect recipe even for our own society, let alone others. Maybe, though, we can help others if we come with humility and a facilitative approach.

Peacemakers & Peacebuilders, Take Heart

Last week I was lucky enough to attend the Alliance for Peacebuilding‘s annual conference. It was my first time attending, and I think it’s my new favorite conference, striking what for me is the right balance of practical and practitioner-friendly topics but well informed by scholarship. One thing that struck me was how   no one was dwelling on the difficult current political climate. Instead, everyone seemed fully engaged in whatever issues, regions, or goals they were working on; all seemed to continue with hope.

What about you? If you work in peacebuilding, peacemaking, conflict resolution, etc.–or are merely interested in these subjects–have you been feeling discouraged? I’ve certainly had my moments. These are not the brightest days for peace. Nativist, nationalist, exclusionary movements are ascendant in places ranging from Europe and the US to Turkey and India. The number of armed conflicts reached a post-Cold War peak of 52 in 2015, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. There’s a bit of an epidemic of presidents-cum-dictators overstaying their constitutional term limits in Africa. The danger of nuclear war feels the highest it’s been since the 1980s. You’ve got some solid reasons for that grim look on your face.

The reality looks a bit different, though, if you step back and look at longer-term trends. Check out this graph from the Human Security Report 2013, p. 18:

It shows a bumpy but steep decline in deaths from armed conflict (where at least one party is a state) since the end of World War II. The graph only goes to 2008, but the number of deaths from armed conflict in 2016 was around 90,000 according to UCDP, still below the first horizontal line in this graph — still a historic low.

Things are not quite as happy in the category of “one-sided violence” (see chart below or here) — that is, organized violence targeting civilians, a category that includes both terrorism (included in the black bars) and attacks on civilians by government forces (red bars). (The 1994 red bar is literally off the chart at >500,000 due to the Rwandan genocide.) The recent peak of 2014 is driven by the Islamic State and others closely connected to Syria’s civil war; it is coming back down. Even better, state violence against civilians (the red bars) is down considerably in the last 10 years compared to the previous 15.

So while war is down overall (despite a recent uptick), terrorism has been stubborn. However, there’s another interesting point about terrorism. A State Department report notes on p. 5 that “74% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, and Pakistan).” That means the bulk of the problems are in a few countries plagued by civil war or instability (and notice that the top two were invaded by the United States after the 9/11 attacks). This suggests that terrorism is more symptomatic of broader political conflict than its own distinct threat. Groups like Islamic State and Boko Haram exploit chaos and lawlessness. So to tackle terrorism, we need to keep working to end wars.

And we need to keep getting better at it, which I think we are, slowly. Peace processes account for more war terminations than ever before. In the period 2000-2006 (the latest data I could find), 61% of civil wars ended by negotiation rather than military victory (per Caroline Hartzell, “Civil War Termination,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oct. 2016). That’s compared to numbers well under 30% during the Cold War. Lots of peace negotiations fail, but later resume. Many countries at peace today underwent several distinct peace processes before finally landing on a workable, comprehensive settlement. There is progress to show for all of humanity’s peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. The political winds will change again. We need to press on.

How Much Agreement Is Enough in a Multiparty Negotiation?

My 9-year-old daughter has her multiplication facts down cold. She can give a fast answer to any problem from 0 x 0 to 10 x 10. She is very proud of herself. Or actually, she was, until I came home the other evening from “Curriculum Night” at her school and told her the teachers now expect the kids to know up to 12 x 12. My daughter was upset, frustrated… and most of all indignant: it felt to her that the rules changed in the middle of the game, or at least like this new rule was popping up out of nowhere.

The same thing can happen when the rules change–or were never clear in the first place–about what is “agreement” in a multiparty negotiation. People plunge ahead in the quest for agreement, usually not defining what will happen in the fairly likely event that some, but not all, of the parties reach agreement.

In 1996, during Chad’s struggle with multiple armed insurgencies, president Omar Bongo of Gabon did Chad a favor: he hosted a highly inclusive “roundtable” in the Gabonese town of Franceville. This dialogue included the government, an array of armed groups, and representatives of political parties and civil society. The event ended in disappointment: the government signed a ceasefire agreement with only two of the many armed groups. Judging by his statements to the media, Bongo was offended that the armed groups wanted Chad’s president Deby (Bongo’s guest) to step down. Representatives of the armed groups, however, told reporters that their position (Deby’s departure) was not a precondition to continuing talks. Seems an opportunity was lost. Chad’s long cycle of insurgencies and separate, bilateral agreements continued for two more decades.

Similarly, in 2015, the government of Myanmar and an assortment of armed groups negotiated towards the “Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA). Trouble is, it was only signed by 8 of the 15 armed groups present. This was partly because they were running out of time: then-president Thein Sein was eager to get a deal before he left office. The country is now struggling with three simultaneous peace tracks–NCA signatories are engaged in a political dialogue towards a federal system; some non-signatories are negotiating the terms under which they’d sign on to the ceasefire; other non-signatories are continuing to fight. Commentators agree that peace is a long way off.

What might have helped in each case was agreement in advance on how to determine how much agreement is enough. One option is to aim for a consensus agreement–one that all parties can accept and will support. But it’s always important to define IN ADVANCE what will happen if consensus cannot be reached. Will there be no action? Will the issue be referred to some decision maker? Or is there some “sufficient consensus” that will allow a signed agreement document? “Sufficient consensus” was used in both the South African and Northern Ireland peace processes. In South Africa it was left in the hands of the chairman to determine if sufficient consensus had been reached. In Northern Ireland, there was a detailed definition, with the upshot being that an agreement could go forward if the two biggest parties (the Social Democratic Labour Party and the Ulster Unionist Party) reached agreement. In both cases, some of the smaller parties were dissatisfied, but at least all foresaw this might be the outcome. There was some fallout (the Inkatha Freedom Party engaged in some further violence in South Africa, for example), but it could have been worse, and in each case the peace process did move forward.

The point is to avoid creating a new source of indignation–a new issue to fight about. If participants thought they were coming to try to achieve full agreement of all parties, and then just a few reach agreement and dismiss the concerns of the others, that feels like creating new rules in the middle of the game.


The Surprising Link between Terrorism and Civil War

Where you were on September 11, 2001? (I bet you remember the day as vividly as I do.) I slept late that morning, having been up on and off all night with my then-six-week-old baby. The first weird thing I encountered was a voice mail from my father assuring me that my brother, who worked in Washington, DC, was OK, though he’d begun a long walk home from the office (?!?). Then my husband called from work and said, “Do you know what just happened?!” and proceeded to describe the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. I was in a daze, but I turned on the TV and saw the images that we’ve all seen hundreds of times since. It was surreal — it seemed like a movie. It took me some time to absorb that this had really happened and to feel all those things one feels after a terrorist attack: shock, pain, sadness, anger, rage, fear, helplessness, hopelessness. We feel them all over again, especially when another attack happens in the US, or in Europe — the kinds of places many of us might visit on business or vacation.

It’s not your imagination: terrorism is up in recent years. Check out this graph from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) — it shows the number of terrorist incidents worldwide 1970-2015. Notice, in particular, the dramatic rise from 2004 to 2014 (and let’s hope the decrease of 2014-2015 continues).

Now for what might be a surprise. Even with this steep increase, terrorism is not replacing war as the major form of political violence: In 2015, about 80% of fatalities from organized violence were in “state-based conflicts” meaning where at least one party to the conflict was a national government (see Melander, Petterson & Themner 2016, “Organized Violence 1989-2015,” Journal of Peace Research and this graph) — so basically war.

And terrorism is most certainly not concentrated in places like France, Belgium, the UK or the US. In 2015, “More than 55% of all [terrorist] attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria), and 74% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, and Pakistan)” according to the State Department and START. Notice those lists of countries. What do they have in common? While some have raging civil wars, ALL of them have internal armed conflict between one or more rebel groups and the state, producing at least 25 battle-related deaths per year.

So let’s put this together: Terrorism is up, but most most deaths from organized violence come from bad, old-fashioned war (or the lower-intensity versions thereof). And most terrorism comes from the very countries experiencing that kind of violent conflict. It may seem to us like terrorism is random, or “they hate our freedom” or whatever, but for the most part, terrorists are fighting for the same kinds of causes that rebel groups are — and/or they’re exploiting the chaos and power vacuums created by armed conflicts.

My point is this: While counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism are important fields, they shouldn’t take the place of efforts to prevent and end civil wars. In fact, ending civil wars will probably help end terrorism. The need for peacemaking has not gone away.


Should Extremists Be Included in Peace Negotiations?

In my last blog post, I wrote about the importance of including all major armed rebel groups in peace negotiations. Conveniently, my self-imposed 600(ish)-word limit gave me an excuse to avoid a very difficult question: what if one of those rebel groups (or the only rebel group) is extremist? By that I mean a group that either holds an extremist ideology or uses extreme tactics, including terrorism. The two often go together. This is not an idle question: the Afghan government and its US backers are attempting to negotiate with the Taliban; the Peruvian government declined several offers to negotiate with the Sendero Luminoso; the Philippine government has consistently chosen not to negotiate with the Abu Sayyaf Group; the government of Nepal reached a peace accord with Maoist rebels; the Syrian peace talks have been dogged by questions of which rebel groups are “terrorists.”

I don’t have an easy answer here, but I have identified a small number of key considerations. First, let me back up. There are those who argue one should never negotiate with terrorists, on the grounds that governments should not reward extremists by granting them a seat at the negotiating table. But we all know it happens anyway, sometimes in secret back channels, sometimes openly. Jonathan Powell argues that a government will inevitably end up negotiating with an extremist group if that group has a significant political following. Bill Zartman argues that negotiating with terrorists won’t encourage further terrorism as long as the government makes no substantive concessions. Blum and Heymann caution against negotiating (ransoms etc.) to end terrorist incidents but are more amenable to negotiations to change “the larger political relationship” with the terrorist group.

One case I have studied in detail is that of the Philippine government and the Abu Sayyaf Group. This group has used beheadings, kidnappings, and other delightful tactics to advance its Islamist and secessionist cause. However, the group doesn’t have a huge political following or popular appeal–fighters are sheltered mainly by fellow clan members. The Philippine government has managed to minimize, though not eliminate, the group through military and police measures. My tentative conclusion is a corollary to Powell’s: if a group has minimal public support, it can be safely left out of a peace process and instead managed through security measures.

Meanwhile, it should be noted, other extremist groups in other places have moderated their tactics and/or ideologies through the process of negotiation (and maybe through the maturing of their leaders and the fatigue of their fighters). For example, both the IRA in Northern Ireland and the PLO in the Middle East renounced terrorism as initial back-channel contacts moved into front-channel negotiations. Both evolved through negotiations into political movements, as have Colombia’s FARC, Nepal’s Maoists, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and many other erstwhile extremists.

Here, then, are what I see as key considerations in determining whether extremists should be invited to the negotiating table:

  • What is the group’s following? Are they the widely accepted face of a large political movement, or are they viewed within their own community as fringe?
  • If the group does represent a large political movement, are there other groups that represent the same movement?
  • Has the group indicated any interest in engaging in the peace process? This would most likely come through quiet back channels.
  • If so, might the group be open to renouncing its extreme tactics in exchange for a place at the table?

Unfortunately, it’s very hard to negotiate an end to civil wars or violent uprisings without talking with those who are carrying the weapons. While this may to some extent reward violence, it has the potential to create a stable peace.

How to Ruin a Peace Process: Exclude a Rebel Group

A friend of mine belongs to a dinner club. You know the kind: there are maybe 8-10 members, and they take turns hosting a fancy, home-cooked dinner. My friend travels often, and she’s recently gotten frustrated because the decision making–on who’s hosting when, on what the rules are–always seem to be made without her. (She returns messages quickly so her dinner club friends could easily consult her, she argues, but this doesn’t happen.) She was particularly annoyed when the December dinner included a “secret Santa” exchange in which the expected gift expenditure was, in her opinion, way too high. She enjoys the social aspect of her dinner club (and who doesn’t love a good meal?!), but she feels like kind of an outsider to it, so she’s thinking of withdrawing and doing her socializing (and dining and gift giving) elsewhere.

It’s not all that different with armed rebel groups. It is well established that armed groups that are excluded from peace negotiations are far more likely to be “spoilers”–to continue fighting undeterred or even escalating their military activity while the negotiating parties go about trying to make peace. The principle is similar: if you’re left out of a decision making process, you don’t have the opportunity to influence the decisions made, and you don’t feel the process is yours anyway, so you look for other ways to meet your goals. Rebel groups, by definition, have political goals. If they’re not inside the peace negotiations, they don’t have the opportunity to advance those goals, and they lack any buy-in to the peace process, so they seek to achieve their goals in some other way–that is, continuing to fight.

One example took place in the Philippines in the 1990s. Then-president Fidel Ramos was wise enough to create a National Unification Commission (NUC) to manage the peace process with the Moro (Muslim) independence movement. At that time, there were two major Moro rebel groups: the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and a splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The NUC held exploratory talks with both groups and recommended that the government negotiate with both. The government decided to start negotiations with only the MNLF at first, and the MILF later. This was despite the fact that it was all about the same issue–the political status of the majority-Muslim part of the Philippines. The MNLF and the government concluded a peace agreement in 1996. Negotiations between the government and the excluded group, the MILF, began nearly as soon as the ink was dry, and it took nearly two more decades for that process to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement.

Both the MNLF and the MILF originally wanted independence from the Philippines. In the 1996 peace agreement, the MNLF agreed to autonomy instead. The excluded MILF, however, announced its rejection of the peace deal, recommitted to independence, and fought on, even gaining military strength while the government was busy with the MNLF. During their own negotiations with the government, the MILF, too, eventually agreed to autonomy. But the government’s approach of dealing with just one rebel group at a time, far from making the process more simple and tractable, seems to have only prolonged and complicated this long-running armed conflict.

It may seem easier to have only two parties in a negotiation (and perhaps, to a government leader, less threatening), but the approach of negotiating with only one rebel group at a time does not make settlement of a civil war easier or more successful. Better to enlarge the table and bring all the armed groups together.

Civil Society in Peace Negotiations? Let’s Get Practical.

Do you like to cook? I do, when I have the time and energy (which seems to be less and less often lately). I enjoy getting new recipes and giving them a try. But I have developed a healthy skepticism about recipes. A recipe is just one of many ways to accomplish more or less the same thing.

Let’s take mashed potatoes, for example. I have a recipe that says to use five russet potatoes, two tablespoons of butter, a cup of milk, and salt and pepper. Fine–delicious. Last weekend, though, my daughters and I had fun putting cream cheese in our mashed potatoes. I never saw that in a recipe (frankly I was just trying to get rid of some cream cheese), but it was great. Watching your weight? Substitute chicken stock for milk. Got some cheese in the fridge? Grate it and throw it in. Some chives in your garden? Nice. You get the idea: many ways to come up with a creamy, yummy version of potatoes. Be creative and adapt to your tastes and needs.

So it is with peace processes. Lately, many people are calling for including civil society in peace negotiations. There are good reasons for this–there’s a lot of research showing that when civil society is included, there is more likely to be a comprehensive, lasting peace. I suspect, though, that this inclusivity terrifies mediators and angers governments and rebel leaders, who probably imagine activists and advocates of one or another cause sitting at the negotiating table as equal parties, each with equal power to block consensus on the terms of an agreement.

It needn’t be so. You don’t have to follow that recipe. As with mashed potatoes, you can figure out other ways to accomplish the same goals.

What would those goals be? My own research identified two key ways the inclusion of civil society helped advance the cause of peace. First, civil society participants help steer the negotiations away from private goodies for armed actors (such as amnesties for war crimes and high-level government posts for rebel leaders) and towards addressing underlying sources of conflict such as economic inequalities, corruption, human rights failures, and discrimination against minority groups. Second, civil society groups promote and support the peace process through educating the public, assisting in implementation tasks, and generally advocating for peace and for the peace settlement once reached.

There are lots of ways to get to those goals. For example, there are some successful examples of a separate civil society consultation process set up to inform the peace negotiations. In Guatemala in the early ’90s, the parties to the peace talks agreed to form a Civil Society Assembly which included representatives from across civil society as well as political parties. This Assembly developed a consensus on recommendations for the negotiations, most of which were adopted in the terms of the peace accord. In the Philippines, the government set up a National Unification Commission that undertook a massive consultation effort starting at the provincial level, with results from that level feeding into the regional level and then the national level. These consultations produced a set of recommendations called the Six Paths to Peace, which influenced not only the peace process with the Moro National Liberation Front in the ’90s but even the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a decade later. I was surprised to see how much influence these consultations had in both countries. I’m not saying separate consultation processes are the only way to go, but rather this is one variation on how to get the voices of civil society into the mix.

There’s not a set recipe for peace processes. On the contrary, making peace (like making anything else) requires creativity and adaptability.

Harvard Negotiation & Mediation Clinical Program 10th anniversary


Harvard Negotiation & Mediation Clinical Program 10th anniversary symposium I was invited to the Harvard Negotiation & Mediation Clinical Program for its 10th anniversary symposium. I spoke on a panel titled “Political Dialogue: The Promises and Perils of Facilitation.” Pictured here are (from left to right in the first photo) Toby Berkman, Heather Scheiwe Kulp, Bob Bordone, me, Fr. Josh Thomas, and Liz Joyner. The theme of the panel was how facilitated dialogue or consensus building could help overcome political divides. The event was held before the US elections; the theme seems even more fitting now. Thank you HNMCP and my co-panelists for a stimulating and inspiring discussion.
"Political Dialogue: The Promises and Perils of Facilitation."
Also great to see my old Brown classmate James Kerwin of the Harvard Program on Negotiation.
Photos by Tom Fitzsimmons, copyright HNMCP/Tom FitzsimmonsSuzanne Ghais PhD

What Corporations Neglect in Conflicts with Communities

Did you ever see the movie Erin Brockovich? I LOVE that movie. In it, Julia Roberts plays a single mom who works for a law firm and discovers that Pacific Gas & Electric has been covering up its contamination of nearby residential properties. In my favorite scene, her boss, lawyer Ed Masri, is trying to persuade an affected family to let him represent them. They seem skeptical, and only after Brockovich’s words of empathy for the family do they agree. Then, with the papers signed, the mom of the family offers Bundt cake and some coffee. Masri starts to explain he doesn’t have time, but Brockovich leans over to him and whispers, “Have a f**king cup of coffee, Ed!”

It’s not only in the movies that lawyers and many others underestimate the importance of empathy, trust building, and relationships. And it’s certainly not only in the movies that companies, especially in the extractive sector, find themselves accused of harming neighboring communities–whether they’re guilty or innocent of the charges. I spoke recently with an employee of one company that was being dragged through the mud for allegedly displacing an indigenous community in another country. He earnestly explained why the claims were false and the company had acted properly… but he also acknowledged that the community’s opposition could quite possibly halt the company’s huge project. You can be right, I told him, but still be screwed.

His company is not alone. Conflict between corporations and communities is pervasive, especially in certain critical areas such as the Niger Delta. In fact, it can turn violent and even, as in the case of a copper mine in Papua New Guinea, contribute to civil war. (This war eventually ended with a peace process culminating in 2001.)

All too often, the response of corporate representatives is to explain in rights-based terms why they are right: how they followed all laws and regulations and company policies and human rights standards and Voluntary Principles and so on. Or they might decide negotiation is worthwhile, so they essentially pose the question, “What do you want?” (translation: “How much money do we need to throw at you to make you go away?”) and wonder why the attempt is not well received.

The missing ingredient, friends and upstanding corporate citizens, is relationships.

Of course there are many factors that can make corporate-community relations challenging: cultural and maybe language differences, history, power asymmetries, the roles of national and local governments and laws and law enforcement and private security, etc. But the importance of relationships is pretty much universal. That means you don’t just pull the aggrieved community members into a fancy conference room and try to start trading offers and counteroffers. Instead, you spend time, take a tour, share a meal, listen to their stories, understand why they don’t trust–even if their past bad experiences were not caused by your company!!–and show genuine interest in them as fellow human beings. This is not just once: follow through on your commitments, stay in touch, invest in constructive community engagement, even transformational engagement (read also how corporations can help in conflict transformation). This may be costly, but the costs of conflict are probably higher. It is a worthwhile investment.

In other words, slow down and “Have a f**king cup of coffee”!

Why the Recent UN Resolution on Israeli Settlements Is Good for Peace

I hope you’re enjoying this Christmas/Hannukah/”Festivus” (“for the rest of us”)/New Year’s break. I’ve spent some nice time with family and friends–have you? I love my family, and I love having friends… which makes this blog post pretty risky, because it might make me some enemies.

A few days ago, several members of the UN Security Council introduced a resolution condemning the ongoing building of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. In the recent past, the US had vetoed all proposed resolutions critical of Israeli actions. This time, it abstained. The resolution passed.

This won’t be another diatribe about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, I want to put this in the context of peace processes, and specifically how an international consensus can help overcome a power imbalance that prevents settlement of a conflict.

Often in a conflict, there is one party that more or less favors the status quo, and another party trying to change the status quo. What I’ve observed is that when the powerful, interested countries are unified in their stance that the status quo has to change, it eventually changes. The end of Apartheid in South Africa is a good example. Another is the Northern Ireland conflict, where once the powerful outside players–Britain, Ireland, and the US–agreed on what needed to change, it did. In tragic contrast, the lack of international consensus has hindered settlement of the Syrian civil war, as I wrote a while back. Less well known, the international community is split on the status of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, which is seeking independence. The deadlock there continues.

The deadlock on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues too, of course. There has been a global near-consensus for many years that the status quo should change–that is, the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza should become an independent state. This “two-state solution” would mean Israel would give up land it captured in the 1967 war. Although official US policy has supported this consensus, the US has repeatedly vetoed Security Council measures to that effect. The world has therefore been split between the sole superpower and everyone else. For this moment, at least until Trump’s inauguration, the world speaks with one voice about the need for Israel to stop building settlements as a way to further its claim on the West Bank. We now have a glimmer of hope that the world will now be unified on the two-state solution, the only viable model that has been put forward for Israeli/Palestinian peace.

It is hard to get anyone in a position of power to give something up. In a domestic context, this might be accomplished through law enforcement. In the global context, there is no such thing. The closest we have is the consensus of the international community. For peace processes generally, the broader point is that while the detailed settlement of the conflict must be negotiated by the parties themselves, it is important to obtain a consensus of the key international players on the broad contours of a solution (a “formula” as it’s often called), especially if one party is to be persuaded to give up something. This implies the need for an international tier in a peace process in which the powerful, interested countries negotiate a broad formula for settlement before the warring parties themselves negotiate the specifics. Without this, the outside countries tend to support opposite sides in the conflict and drag out the fighting. We’ve seen this all too many times.

Now, if I’ve made you angry–or if you have any other reaction–please comment!