This time of year, I’m ready for spring. Here in Colorado, temperatures can swing dramatically, so it’s not unusual to have a couple of warm, spring-like days in February, as happened on Friday. That gets my hopes up–yay! spring!!–before they are dashed by another round of snow and cold temperatures (which came in last night).
The recent peace agreement between the US government and the Taliban, while a big accomplishment, is like one of those warm days in February. It’s a respite from the harsh conflict, yes, but it does not signal the arrival of a lasting thaw. Here’s why.
The agreement was negotiated by only those two parties (the antithesis of inclusivity), so naturally it reflects their interests only. It addresses the US goals of ending “America’s Longest War” and ensuring that Afghanistan will not be used as a base for terrorists to threaten the United States and its allies. It also addresses the Taliban’s #1 goal of expelling foreign forces. For this important but limited set of goals, the agreement seems reasonably successful.
What about the other parties to the conflict? Among these are the Afghan government and the people it is supposed to represent (not to mention foreign actors like Pakistan). The Taliban insisted on negotiating only with the US, so this deal was a logical first step. However, while the agreement states that the next step will be negotiation between the Afghan government and the Taliban, there is nothing linked to that–in other words, no consequence if the Taliban abandons such talks and tries to reconquer the whole country. Presumably the 14-month coalition draw-down could be slowed if the talks are not progressing, but after the 14 months, US leverage is gone. And believe me, the negotiations on Afghanistan’s political future will take much longer–that is a far huger and more complex set of issues than the present agreement that took 10 years or several months to negotiate (depending how you count).
In this respect, the agreement is a perfect reflection of President Trump’s approach to foreign policy. He has said that the US will look after its own interests, just as other countries look after their own interests. This has tended to mean narrow, short-term self-interests, however. Granted, the original reason for the invasion over 18 years ago was to prevent another 9/11 being plotted from Afghan soil. But what about the long-term stability of Afghanistan? Is that not in the enlightened, long-term self-interest of the US? The agreement basically says, Go forth and negotiate your future, Afghans, and we’ll leave you alone. After 18 years of what amounts to foreign occupation, however, and with ongoing internal conflict, it is unlikely Afghans can do this without considerable outside help. This means that all the progress Afghans have made towards democracy, human rights, and women’s equality is at risk.
The coalition withdrawal leaves the locals to duke it out themselves, possibly generating more conflict, more regional instability, more outflows of refugees, more economic impact, and more conditions that favor the rise of extremism. One can question whether the invasion should have occurred to begin with, whether the gains are worth the enormous sacrifices made by soldiers and their families. But with that deed done, the question is how to exit responsibly. The lesson has been relearned over and over again: as the foreign occupier, if you want long-term stability, you have to stick around to help (re)build local institutions. (Otherwise put: you break it, you buy it.) In the case of Afghanistan, that work is far from complete.
Thanks for your insightful assessment.